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A city community is infested with smoke from a railroad
switching yard nearby. It is proposed that the people living in
the vicinity should organize a corporation to purchase the land
used for switching purposes and to convert it into a restricted
residence district. All of the residents and property owners in
the neighborhood would benefit if such a proposal were con-
summated and the support of a large number of them would be
necessary for its success. To be assured of their co-operation,
promoters induce a number of them to sign a preliminary agree-
ment in which it is stated that each signer subscribes for a certain
number of shares in the corporation to be formed, and that the
signers appoint a committee to purchase the land and convey it
to the corporation which they shall cause to be organized. Does
the signer of such a paper incur any obligation to take the shares
as agreed? If so, what is the nature of the obligation, who is
the proper party to enforce it, and from what time is the signer
bound thereby?
As simple as these questions seem to be, in Missouri as in
many other jurisdictions they cannot be readily answered as a
result of the decisions. The case stated is substantially that of
DeGiverville Land Co. v. Thompson 1 in which the recent decision
of the St. Louis Court of Appeals marks an advance over previous
decisions of the Missouri courts.
Preliminary stock subscription agreements are no longer in
general use. In the early part of the last century they were a
popular means of organizing corporations, but the more modern
general statutes of incorporation which now exist in all of the
states have made it less convenient to resort to such methods
of organization.2 In some instances they are still necessary, how-
1. (1915) 190 Mo. App. 682, 176 S. W. 409.
2. Conyngton, Corporate Organization, p. 23.
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ever. Whenever the organization of a quasi-public or co-
operative undertaking is contemplated they are not only con-
venient, but almost indispensable. If, for instance, it were pro-
posed to build a railroad from Columbia to Jefferson City for
which the capital were not available, it would be necessary to
resort to some such method of enlisting co-operation. Milk con-
densing companies are frequently organized in this way.
A business agreement such as that under consideration
should be approached with a desire to find it susceptible of being
interpreted in such a way that it can be given legal support.3
We are not dealing with a voluntary subscription to a charitable
enterprise in the success of which the subscribers have no pe-
cuniary interest. It is more than a gratuitous undertaking of
each subscriber to take a certain portion of the stock, and if
it is clear that the prospective shareholders intended to be bound
some basis should be found for holding them. But the agree-
ment must stand analysis according to ordinary principles of the
law of contracts-the situation is not unique, except that the
questions which usually arise have to do with the rights of the
corporation which comes into being after the transaction is coin-
pleted.
II CORPORATION MEMBERSHIP IN GENERAL
Membership in a corporation must be the result either of
statute or of contract.4 A corporation must have some member-
ship at the time of its birth, and therefore some statutory designa-
tion is necessary in every case. A person may be made a member
of a public corporation with or without his assent, for such cor-
porations are agencies of government; but one can be made a
member of a private corporation only with his assent -, and such
3. "It is the policy of the law to interpret a business agreement in
the sense which will give it a legal support." Holmes, J., in Martin v.
Meles (1901) 179 Mass. 114, 60 N. E. 397. Cf. Twin Creek & Colemans-
ville Turnpike Co. v. Lancaster (1881) 79 Ky. 552; Bullock v. Fal-
mouth & Chipman Hall Turnpike Road Co. (1887) 85 Ky. 184, 3 S.
W. 129.
4. 1 Lindley, Companies (6th ed.) p. 12.
5. Morrison v. Morey (1898) 146 Mo. 543, 48 S. W. 629; Ellis v.
Marshall (1807) 2 Mass. 269, 3 Am. Dec. 49; Hampshire v. Franklin
(1819) 16 Mass. 76; Richmond Factory Assn. v. Clarke (1873) 61
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assent must continue during the time of the statute's operation
unless it has previously been expressed in such a way as to be
irrevocable.6 The statute may designate any assenting person as
a member of the corporation which is brought into being under
its provisions. The public policy which demands that corpora-
tions should have substantial and responsible membership at the
time of their birth appeals only to the legislature which enacts
the statute. It is competent for a legislature to endow a corpora-
tion with any sort of statutory membership and in return to
impose on its members any sort of statutory obligations. Such
obligations are not consensual in any real sense and no initial con-
tract is necessary for their creation, tho it is common to speak
of the obligations inter se of shareholders and incorporators as
contractual. The statute may confine corporation membership to
those who sign articles of association,7 or it may include signers
of preliminary subscriptions not incorporated into the articles of
association." In any case the statutory designation by the state
becomes the law of association of members of the corporation
and common law rules as to contracts do not apply; but unless it
is expressly provided that the corporation endowed with statutory
membership should have no power to enter into common law
contracts of membership it would seem that any corporation may
proceed to enter into contracts by which new membership is
created.
Prior to its organization, of course, the corporation may not
enter into any contract of membership, 9 but if persons see fit to
do so they may contract for its benefit and the corporation should
stand as any other beneficiary when it comes into existence. This
involves an extension of the law as to beneficiary contracts to
Maine 351. In Kirkwood Gymnasium Assn. v. Van Ness (1895) 61
Mo. App. 361, it is not clear that one of the alleged incorporators
assented, but the point was not well considered.
6. Kidwelly Canal Co. v. Raby (1816) 2 Price 93; 1 Lindley,
Partnership (4th ed.) p. 127.
7. Troy & Boston R. R. v. Tibbits (1854) 18 Barb. 297.
8. A Michigan statute was so interpreted in Peninsular Ry. Co.
v. Duncan (1873) 28 Mich. 130.
9. "A non-existing corporation can no more make a contract for
the sale of its stock than an unbegotten child can make a contract
for the purchase of it." Bryant Pond Steam Mill Co. v. Felt (1895) 87
Maine 234, 32 AtI. 888.
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cases where the beneficiary is not in existence at the time of con-
tracting, but no reason is perceived why such extension should
not be made tho the cases outside the field of corporations may
not yet have gone so far. 10  A corporation may by novation
become a party to a contract made by its promoters prior to its
organization if the other party to the contract has assented to
such novation. Strict ratification or adoption of such contracts
is impossible because of the non-existence of the corporation at
the time of contracting," and the corporation must voluntarily
assume any obligation of membership or contract made either
before or after its organization.
After its organization, a corporation may contract as any
other legal entity may. It may contract for any number of new',
memberships, except as it may be restricted by a statutory limit
on its capital stock. 12 Such contracts are not required to be in
any particular form, apart from statutory provisions; ': any ex-
pression of mutual assent is sufficient, if definite enough to be
enforceable. 14 The requirements as to contracting parties, offer
and acceptance are not peculiar. No certificate is necessary, the
certificate being merely a "niuniment of title". 15 No particular
10. In Whitehead v. Burgess (1897) 61 N. J. L. 75, 38 Atl. 802,
a contract of the defendant to pay a sum of money to the owner of
the first one of the foals of defendant's stallion that should trot a mile
in two minutes and thirty seconds or legs, was enforced. The court
said that "the fact that the person to whose benefit the promise may
inure is uncertain at the time it is made, and that it cannot be known
until the happening of a contingency, cannot deprive the person who
afterwards establishes his claim to be the beneficiary of the promise
of the right to recover upon it." The plaintiff was in existence at the
time of contracting, and the demurrer admitted a bilateral contract for
the benefit of the plaintiff.
11. Abbott v. Hapgood (1889) 150 Mass. 248, 22 N. E. 907;
Pennell v. Lothrop (1906) 191 Mass. 357, 359, 77 N. E. 842. Cf. Joy v.
Mannion (1887) 28 Mo. App. 55.
12. On the effect of subscriptions in excess of authorized capital,
see 1 Machen, Corporations, § 230; Granger's Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Kamper (1882) 73 Ala. 325; Clark v. Turner (1884) 73 Ga. 1.
13. Nulton v. Clayton (1880) 54 Iowa 425, 6 N. W. 685.
14. Quaere, whether such mutual assent had not been expressed in
Palais du Costume Co. v. Beach (1910) 144 Mo. App. 456, 129 S. W.
270, (1911) 163 Mo. App. 499, 143 S. W. 852.
15. V'anstone v. Goodwin (1890) 42 Mo. App. 39. "A certificate
is evidence of title to stock; it is not stock itself, nor is it necessary
to the existence of stock." Pacific National Bank v. Eaton (1891) 141
U. S. 227, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 984.
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shares need be allotted. 6 Unless writing is specifically required
by statute, the contract may be oral.1 7 An actual subscription is
usually unnecessary,18 and where it is required a literal "signing
underneath" is not to be insisted upon. 19 The name subscription
contract is therefore an inapt description of membership contracts
made after incorporation.
Several other kinds of agreements are frequently put in the
category of subscription contracts, but improperly: contracts to
subscribe for stock at a future time where some future act of
subscription is contemplated, 20 contracts to see that other persons
subscribe for stock,2 1 and contracts to purchase treasury or other
issued stock.22  None of these needs to be considered in the
present study.
Estoppel is frequently said to be a third road to membership
in a corporation. It is, however, no more than a reason for
preventing a denial of statutory or contract membership where
neither is admitted to exist.
2 3
16. Allotment is required by statute in England. Ward's Case
(1870) L. R. 10 Eq. 659; Adam's Case (1872) L. R. 13 Eq. 474. Reg-
istration is also necessary in England. 1 Lindley, Companies (6th
ed.) p. 125.
17. Butler University v. Scoonover (1888) 114 Ind. 381, 16 N. E.
342; Bullock v. Falmouth, etc. Co. (1887) 85 Ky. 184, 3 S. W. 129; Col.
fax Hotel Co. v. Lyon (1886) 69 Iowa 683, 29 N. W. 780; Chafitn v.
Cummings (1853) 37 Maine 76; Wemple v. St. Louis, etc. It. R. Co.
(1887) 120 Ill. 196, 11 N. E. 906; Shellenberger v. Patterson (1895) 168
Pa. St. 30, 31 Atl. 943. Contra, Fanning v. Hibernia Insurance Co.
(1881) 37 Ohio State 339; Pittsburg, etc. R. R. Co. v. Gazzam (1858)
32 Pa. St. 340; Freeland v. N. J. Stone Co. (1878) 29 N. J. Eq. 188.
18. See Pacific National Bank v. Eaton (1891) 141 U. S. 227, 11
Sup. Ct. Rep. 984.
19. In re Strong (1891) 16 N. Y. Supp. 104.
20. Cf. 6 Michigan Law Review 340.
21. The ordinary underwriting agreement usually provides for
the underwriter's subscribing if others do not. Cf. Colonial Trust Co.
v. McMillan (1905) 188 Mo. 547, 87 S. W. 933.
22. A sale of treasury stock involves a renovation of the original
contract just as a sale by a shareholder involves a novation. Mc-
Dowell v. Lindsay (1906) 213 Pa. 591, 63 AtI. 130. Sales of treasury
stock are distinguished from original subscriptions in Sherman v.
Shaughnessy (1910) 148 Mo. App. 679, 129 S. W. 245.
23. "Where the subscription has been acquiesced in, either by
becoming a director or by attending meetings of stockholders, or by
any other act indicating an acquiescence in the validity of his sub-
scription, [a] defense based on mere technical objections will be dis-
regarded." Napton, J., In Kansas City Hotel Co. v. Hunt (1874) 57
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Membership in a corporition, whether statutory or con-
tractual, usually results in an ownership of shares of stock. But
membership does not always involve shareholding and statutory
membership is frequently dissociated from owning shares. In
some states, signers of articles of incorporation who thereby
become incorporators need not become shareholders.24  Where
this is true and unless shareholding is not contemplated at all,2 5
the function of the incorporators is really that of promoters 26
and after they have completed the organization and managed the
issuance of the shares they disappear altogether27 unless the
statute provides for their continuance. 28 If a statute names the
members of a corporation and requires them to be shareholders it
would seem that no action is necessary on the part of the corpora-
tion to constitute the incorporators shareholders, 29 for it has no
option to accept or reject,30 its obligation to receive as share-
holders being the statutory return for the statutory obligations
of the shareholders.
Shares of stock have had so many of the qualities of choses
in possession ascribed to them that the precise nature of the
Mo. 130. See also Kirkwood Gymnasium Assn. v. Van Ness (1895) 61
Mo. App. 361; Business Men's Assn. v. Williams (1909) 137 Mo. App.
575, 119 S. W. 439.
24. Coyote Gold and Silver Mining Co. v. Ruble (1880) 8 Oregon
284; Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore (1870) 64 Pa. St. 43; Bristol Trust
Co. v. Jonesboro Trust Co. (1898) 101 Tenn. 545, 48 S. W. 228; 1
Machen, Corporations, § 164 et seq.
25. While a few statutes have the positive requirement of share-
holding for membership and some have it by implication, many of the
statutes are silent on this point. See 1 Machen, Corporations, § 132.
26. In San Joaquin Land & Water Co. v. Beecher (1894) 101
Cal. 70, 35 Pac. 349, they are said to be the agents of the intended
shareholders. Sed qu.
27. "They are functi oficii and the corporation Is thenceforth
composed of the shareholders." Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore (1870)
64 Pa. St. 43, 54. Hence the statement that "corporators exist before
stockholders and do not exist with them." Chase v. Lord (1879) 77
N. Y. 1, 11.
28. In Case of Philadelphia Savings Institution (1836) 1 Whar-
ton 461, note, some of the members were and some were not share-
holders.
29. See Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. (1869) 101 Mass.
385; 1 Machen, Corporations, § 164.
30. In Windsor Electric Light Co. v. Tandy (1894) 66 Vt. 248,
29 Atl. 248, it was said that the corporation is presumed to accept,
which means that no acceptance is necessary. Registration Is said
to be required in Dancy v. Clark (1905) 24 D. C. App. 487. See Machen,
Corporations, §§ 164, 242.
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obligations of the shareholder and corporation inter se is often
misconceived. A Missouri statute provides that stock is to "be
deemed personal estate", 3 1 and shares have been held to be
"goods, wares and merchandise, within the purview of the
statute of frauds";32 but in essence a share of stock is
nothing more than a chose in action, the result of a bilateral
undertaking. The shareholder's l)rimary obligation is to pay to
the corporation the par value of his shares or some other amount
agreed upon, as it shall be demandedA 3 The corporation in turn
is bound to admit the subscriber to the privileges which its charter
and by-laws confer upon shareholders, to a degree of control cor-
responding to the relative importance of this and other holdings,
to a proportionate share of such dividends as may be declared
and to a proportionate interest in the property in case of dis-
solution. These bilateral obligations are the same whether they
arise out of statute or contract.3 4  It is therefore erroneous to
conceive a subscription to stock to be a sale of property by the
corporation,3 5 for the corporation does not own its unissued
stock. A subscription need not therefore comply with the statute
of frauds 36 even tho a sale of stock is so restricted. Any later
transfer of shares is effective as a novation in the choses in action,
to which the corporation has assented in advance. This free as-
signability makes it unobjectionable to speak of a share of stock
"as soon as it is created, as transferable property".3 7
31. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2984.
32. Fine v. Hornsby (1876) 2 Mo. App. 61; Tisdale v. Harris(1838) 2 Pickering (Mass.) 9. The better view would seem to be
contra. See Browne, Statute of Frauds (5th ed.) § 396; 1 Machen,
Corporations, § 505.
33. Hawley v. Uplon (1880) 102 U. S. 314.
34. It is for this reason that It is said that "the rights and duties
of both parties grow out of contract." Supply Ditch Co. v. Elliott
(1887) 10 Col. 327, 332, 15 Pac. 691; Haskell v. Sells (1883) 14 Mo.
App. 91, 102.
35. As in Thrasher v. Pike County R. R. (1861) 25 Ill. 393.
36. York Park Building Assn. v. Barnes (1894) 39 Neb. 834, 58
N. W. 440; Wemple v. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. (1887) 120 Ill. 196, 11
N. E. 906.
37. Haskell v. Worthington (1887) 94 Mo. 560, 570, 7 S. W. 481;
Vanstone v. Goodwin (1890) 42 Mo. App. 39; Hamilton v. Finnegan
(1902) 117 Iowa 623, 91 N. W. 1039; 1 Machen, Corporations, § 504. In
Newman v. Mercantile Trust Co. (1905) 189 Mo. 423, 88 S. W. 6, it
was held that trover may be maintained for shares of stock.
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This analysis indicates that shareholding membership in-
volves in no sense a contract between various shareholders. There
is no good reason for a disregard of the corporate entity here.
Shareholders have some obligations inter se, but these are not
contractual. The obligations of each shareholder are independent
of other shareholders' obligations. Articles of incorporation may
contain a contract between the various subscribers, but this is not
a necessary part of them.
III VARIOUS TYPES OF PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS
Since a corporation has no capacity to contract prior to its
birth, no preliminary agreement can have the effect of constituting
the parties thereto members or shareholders in the corporation.
But the situation presents no inherent difficulty and the confusion
in the cases is largely due to a failure to distinguish between the
rights inter se of the subscribers and the rights of the later-created
corporate entity. Numerous forms of preliminary agreements are
possible, each of which should be construed with reference to the
expressed intention of the parties. But there is an unfortunate
tendency to lump all agreements in one class and to determine
their validity according to principles not universally applicable.
It is important in every case to see just what the parties have
agreed to do.
Since preliminary papers are usually circulated by some spe-
cially interested promoter,38 the agreement frequently takes the
form of a contract between this promoter and each of the sub-
scribers. If the subscriber is desirous of seeing the project a
success, he may give his promise to take a certain number of
shares in the corporation to be formed in return for and in con-
sideration of the promoter's promise to put thru the organization,
and perhaps to see that the subscriber is accorded the privilege
of becoming a shareholder; 39 or the promoter may agree to con-
38. All preliminary subscribers are In a sense promoters. Pen-
insular R. R. Co. v. Duncan (1873) 28 Mich. 130.
39. It was held that there was no such promise in Feitel v. Drey-
fous (La., 1906) 117 La. 756, 42 So. 259. In Dennison v. Keasbey
(1906) 200 Mo. 408, 98 S. W. 546, the plaintiff and defendant entered
into a contract to form a corporation, the plaintiff agreeing to render
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vey to the corporation a tract of land or to transfer a stock of
goods. Primarily this is a contract between the subscriber and the
promoter, each acting for himself. The corporation when it is
born can neither ratify nor adopt it. The subscriber usually con-
tracts to enter into a contract with the corporation, but the cor-
poration will be under no obligation to contract with him and if
it refuses the subscriber will be relieved of his obligation to the
promoter.
The promoter could of course recover for the breach of the
subscriber's contract, tho it may be difficult to determine what
damage he has suffered by reason of the subscriber's failure to
contract with the corporation. In that the subscriber has bound
himself to enter into a contract with the corporation, it is ex-
pressly a contract for the benefit of a third person, the corporation.
Such contracts are enforced in Missouri both in gift beneficiary
and payment beneficiary cases, 40 and no reason is perceived why
they should not be enforced where the beneficiary, tho definite
and ascertainable, is not in existence at the time the contract is
made.4 1 Until the birth of a beneficiary, the obligation to benefit
it would of course remain contingent upon its coming into being.
The benefit t6 the corporation from the subscriber's promise con-
sists in having an offer open for its consideration. It is a ques-
tion of some nicety in the law of contracts whether such a "paid-
for" offer can be withdrawn so as to preclude the completion of
a contract by the corporation's accepting it. It would seem that
even tho the "paid-for" offer relates to subject matter of such a
nature that equity would refuse specific performance of a contract
relating to it, the law may well disregard the attempt to withdraw
or revoke the offer, thereby giving specific performance to the
personal services to promote the project, in return for which he was
to be given five per cent of the capital stock. The plaintiff was not
named a shareholder in the articles and the defendant, who-had stock,
was .ordered to transfer to the plaintiff the amount stipulated for.
40. See 8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 38. On the general
subject of beneficiary contracts, see Professor Clark's article in 4 Law
Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 30, and Professor Williston's article in
15 Harvard Law Review 767.
41. Saunders v. Saunders (1891) 154 Mass. 337, 28 N. E. 270, which
looks contra, was decided where no beneficiary contracts are enforce-
able.
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contract to keep the offer open.42  No reason is perceived for
distinguishing between a contract to keep open an offer made
by one of the parties to the other and a contract to keep open
an offer made by one of the parties to a third person, in this case
the corporation.
It is usually held that prior to assent by the beneficiary, either
party to a beneficiary contract may release the other.43 In Mis-
souri, the beneficiary's assent is presumed, 44 with the result that
a release is impossible without the beneficiary's concurrence. The
corporation is not in the position of the ordinary gift or payment
beneficiary, however, for it is entitled to no benefit from the sub-
scriber's offer, beyond that of considering it, without accepting
the offer. In a sense, it assents to the contract made for its
benefit when it considers the offer, but such assent might not
preclude the promoter from releasing the subscriber. And prior
to the incorporation, a release should be effectual for it can
hardly be said that the assent of a non-existing beneficiary can be
presumed.45
42. This view has been expressed by Professor McGovney In a
valuable article on "Irrevocable Offers," in 27 Harvard Law Review
644. An offer under seal should be treated as a "paid-f6r" offer where
seals are not abolished. In Nelson Coke & Gas Co. v. Pellatt (1902)
4 Ontario 481, it was held that an offer under seal to take shares in
an existing corporation was therefore irrevocable. But if no offeree
is in existence, it is difficult to see how the offer can be irrevocable,
even tho under seal or "paid-for." See Hudson Real Estate Co. v.
Tower (1892) 156 Mass. 82, 84, 30 N. E. 465.
A contract for the sale of shares of stock will be specifically en-
forced where the shares are not procurable in the market, Dennison v.
Keasby (1906) 200 Mo. 408, 98 S. W. 546, or where they constitute a
controlling interest In the company, O'Neill v. Webb (1899) 77 Mo.
App. 1. Some such special reason for the inadequacy of damages
must appear. The contract of subscription for shares of stock Is always
specifically enforceable if completed, for it gives rise to the status
of shareholder and the obligations of the shareholder, such as that
of paying calls, may be specifically enforced in actions by the corpo-
ration.
43. Wood, v. Moriarty (1885) 16 R. I. 201, 9 Ati. 427; Williston,
Cases on Contracts, p. 410 note.
44. Rogers v. Gosnell (1875) 58 Mo. 589. Cf. Amonett v. Montague
(1881) 75 Mo. 43.
45. A subscriberis released by any material departure from the
original purpose or scheme unless he assents to it. Norwich Lock
Mfg. Co. v. Hockaday (1893) 89 Va. 557, 16 S. E. 877. In Haskell v.
Worthington (1887) 94 Mo. 560, 7 S. W. 481, It was said that the or-
ganization of a company with powers additional but incidental to
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It is possible for a preliminary subscriber to give to a pro-
moter a power of attorney to contract for him with the corpora-
tion when it is formed. In England, such a power is irrevocable
"where an agreement is entered into on a sufficient consideration,
whereby an authority is given for the purpose of securing some
benefit to the donee of the authority", as for instance, where the
object of the contract is to enable the promoter to obtain his
purchase money for-property to be sold to the corporation. 46
It would seem that such a power should be revocable where the
promoter has no more at stake than the success of his efforts to
put the corporation on its feet. If the authority is given as
security for the performance of the contract between the sub-
scriber and the promoter, it should be irrevocable. But this means
only that the subscriber owes a specifically enforceable duty to
the promoter to permit him to exercise the power, and the sub-
scriber does not come under any obligation to the corporation
except in consequence of an exercise of the power.
4 7
While analysis thus shows great difficulty in working out an
irrevocable obligation of the subscriber on the principles of bene-
ficiary contracts, there is another possibility of finding it, viz.,
on the principles of novation. The subscriber's contract with the
promoter may conceivably admit of the corporation's being sub-
stituted for the promoter by a novation assented to in advance.
The effect-of such a substitution would be to relieve the promoter
from further liability. 48  But a pre-incorporation subscription
agreement will be so framed as to make these principles of nova-
those originally contemplated does not constitute such a departure, but
the case was decided on other grounds. Cf. Board v. Mississippi, etc.
R. R. Co. (1859) 21 Il. 337; Dorris v. Sweeney (1875) 60 N. Y. 462;
Woods Motor Vehicle Co. v. Brady (1905) 181 N. Y. 145, 73 N. E. 674.
In Southern Hotel Co. v. Newman (1860) 30 Mo. 118, it was held error
to exclude evidence that the venture to which the defendants sub-
scribed was wholly abandoned and that the corporation was the result
of a different venture. Cf. Richmond Factory Assn. v. Clarke (1873) 61
Maine 351.
46. Carmichael's Case (1896) 2 Ch. 643. The contract expressly
provided that the power should be irrevocable.
47. See Machen, Corporations, § 251; Mechem, Agency (2d ed.)§ 570 et seq. Cf. Staroske v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. (1911) 235 Mo. 67,
138 S. W. 36.
48. See McArthur v. Times Printing Co. (1892) 48 Minn. 319, 51
N. W. 216.
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tion applicable only when there are such responsible promoters
willing to bind themselves by contracts with subscribers, and these
are frequently lacking. Thirdly, it may be asked whether it is
possible for the prospective shareholders to contract among them-
selves so that each will be bound from the moment of subscrib-
ing.
It is competent for each subscriber to contract with each of
the others or for each subscriber to contract with all of the others.
Charitable subscriptions are sometimes enforced as such con-
tracts.49 But the subscribers do not in the ordinary case intend
to exchange mutual promises, and a clear expression of such
intention is necessary. Each case must be examined to determine
whether as a matter of fact the subscriber's promise is given for
other subscribers' promises. A may agree to take stock in return
for B's agreeing to take stock, but this seldom occurs. The
promises of the various subscribers may be mutual, but they
rarely are so. If mutual, they are sufficient consideration for
each other and the numerous bilateral contracts bind the various
subscribers to each other. A defaulting subscriber could be sued
for the breach by all of the others if the contract is construed
to be with all the others,50 or by each of the others if the contract
is by each with each of the others; tho such a liability has seldom
if ever been enforced.5 1 Such a contract does not have the effect
of making the various subscribers partners.5 2  The subscriber
may obligate himself to assist in the incorporation or to become
a shareholder if the corporation will admit him after incorporation
is completed.53 The latter obligation is a beneficiary contract to
enter into a contract with the corporation and should be treated
as the similar contract with the promoter was treated above.
49. See Professor Williston's note on charitable subscriptions in
Parsons, Contracts (9th ed.) p. 490.
50. Cf. Moore v. Chesley (1845) 17 N. H. 151.
51. It was suggested in Lake Ontario R. R. v. Curtiss (1880) 80
N. Y. 219; and the petition in Loewenberg v. De Voigne (1909) 145
Mo. App. 712, 123 S. W. 99, seems to have been framed on this idea.
52. 1 Lindley, Companies (6th ed.) p. 21. But see Taylor, Cor-
porations, § 100.
53. Where the subscriber agrees to pay a certain sum to the
treasurer of the corporation to be formed, it Is clearly a beneficiary
contract. West v. Crawford (1889) 80 Cal. 19, 21 Pac. 1123; San Joa-
quin Land & Water Co. v. Beecher (1894) 101 Cal. 70, 35 Pac. 349.
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A subscription does not become a binding contract by reason
of the fact that other persons are led to subscribe on the strength
of it; and reliance is in no sense a consideration for the sub-
scriber's promise. If A promises to give B ten dollars and C
sells a coat to B in reliance on A's promise to B, A's promise
does not therefore become binding. Nor should the fact that a
corporation is organized in reliance on a subscriber's promise
render that promise enforceable. Charitable subscriptions are
in this respect treated anomalously by some courts in their anxiety
to uphold them. 54 But the agreements in hand are not charitable
subscriptions and unless the promise is made in consideration that
the action be taken, in which case it is an offer to a unilateral
contract, there is no reason why action unstipulated for and
merely in reliance on a promise should make it binding. The
fact that money is expended in incorporation furnishes no sup-
port for a subscriber's promise, for it is in no sense made in
return for such expenditure.5 5 Estoppel is frequently found in
such cases, due to the confusion of promises with representations.
It is submitted that in the ordinary preliminary subscription
agreement, the subscriber's promise to take shares is nothing more
than a statement of his intention to do so and as such of no
binding effect. It is possible to have a preliminary subscription
made in such a way as to be binding; but in most of the cases
it has not been done. A subscription may, however, constitute
an offer to the corporation to be formed, which offer will bind
the subscriber if properly accepted by the corporation. Such
an offer is of course revocable at any time prior to acceptance.5 6
54. Pitt v. Gentle (1871) 49 Mo. 74; James v. Clough (1887) 25
Mo. App. 153.
55. Addressing itself to the incorporation as consideration for
the subscriber's promise, the Pennsylvania court said that "procuring
legislation of any kind is not a consideration which will support
even a direct promise to pay a fair compensation for the labor of the
promissee about such a business." Strasburg R. R. Co. v. Echternacht
(1853) 21 Pa. 220. OI. Jeanette Bottle Works v. Scholl (1900) 13 Pa.
Super. Ct. 96, 100.
56. It was suggested in Knox v. Childersburg Land Co. (1889) 86
Ala. 180, 184, 560, 578, that "the terms of the offer and the considera-
tion it rests on may render It binding and irrevocable" and that "when
it rests on a valuable consideration, it becomes an irrevocable option."
One may conceive of an offeree's buying an option on the offer. Cf.
Sooy v. Winter (Mo. 1915) 175 S. W. 132. But the corporation ac-
quires no option in the subscriber's offer In the ordinary case.
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The numerous cases which permit subscribers to withdraw before
the incorporation is completed proceed on this ground.57 Until
the corporation comes into existence, it is inaccurate to speak of
an offer to it for there is no offeree. The birth of the corporation
obviates this difficulty but the offer ought still to be subject to
withdrawal until actual acceptance by the corporation.5 s Such
acceptance ought not to be presumed for it puts an obligation on
the corporation. 59 The birth of th6 corporation in itself is in no
sense an acceptance of the offer even tho effected in reliance
on it."° When the unwithdrawn offer is duly accepted by the
corporation, the contract of shareholding becomes complete and
the relation of corporation and shareholder is created.6
A preliminary subscription may be so informal, however,
that it is not even entitled to the dignity of an offer. A mere
expression of the signer's intention to take shares in a corporation
to be organized is of no more legal significance than an expres-
sion of one's intention to buy a horse. 2 An offer must be found
57. Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower (1892) 156 Mass. 82, 30
N. E. 465 (1894) 161 Mass. 10, 36 N. E. 680, is the .leading ease per-
mitting withdrawal before incorporation. See also Knox v. Childers-
burg Land Co. (1888) 86 Ala. 180, 5 So. 578; Richelieu Hotel Co. v.
International Military Encampment Co. (1892) 140 Il. 248, 29 N. E.
1044; Vermilion Sugar Co. v. Vallee (La., 1914) 64 So. 670; Athol Mu-
sic.Hall Co. v. Carey (1875) 116 Mass. 471; Plank's Tavern Co. v. Burk-
hard (1891) 87 Mich. 182, 49 N. W. 562; Wright Bros. v. Merchants'
& Planters' Packet Co. (Miss., 1913) 61 So. 550; Ashuelot Boot & Shoe
Co. v. Hoit (1870) 56 N..H. 548; Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. De La
Green (1888) 143 Pa. St. 269, 13 Atl. 747; Badger Paper Co. v. Rose
(1897) 95 Wis. 145, 70 N. W. 302; Doherty v. Arkansas, etc. R. ft. Co.
(1905) 142 Fed. 104. See 8 Columbia Law Review 47.
But contra, the leading case of Minneapolis Threshing Co. v. Davis
(1889) 40 Minn. 110, 41 N. W. 1026. See also Nebraska Chicory Co. v.
Lednicky (1907) 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W. 245.
58. Starrett v. Rockland Co. (1876) 65 Maine 374; Bryant's Pond
Steam Mill Co. V. Felt (1895) 87 Maine 234, 32 Atl. 888.
59. In Poughkeepsie, etc. Road Co. v. Griffin (1856) 21 Barbour
454, 467, it was suggested that "acceptance may be presumed from
the beneficial nature of the offer." Sed qu.
60. Cf. Cleaveland v. Mullen (1903) 96 Md. 598, 607, 54 Atl. 665.
61. So it is said that "the criterion of the liability of a subscriber
to stock in a corporation is, whether any act has been done by which
the corporation has been forced to receive the subscriber." Kirkwood
Gymnasium Assn. v. Van Ness (1895) 61 Mo. App. 361; Commerce
Trust Co. v. Hettinger (1914) 181 Mo. App. 338, 168 S. W. 911.
62. Strasburg R. R. Co. v. Echternacht (1853) 21 Pa. St. 220. But
cf. Shober v. Lancaster County Park Assn. (1871) 68 Pa. 429.
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to have been intended, and courts have a justifiable inclination
to find that subscriptions are not idle expressions of intention.63
The foregoing analysis emphasizes the importance of de-
termining which of these situations is present in a particular
case. But subscription papers have often been unskillfully drawn
and without stopping to analyse them many courts have attempted
to lay down general rules which, as this discussion shows, admit
only of narrow application. The consequent confusion prevails
generally.
IV MISSOURI STATUTES OF INCORPORATION IN RELATION TO
PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS
The various statutes of incorporation must now be examined
with a view to determining how they affect the position of pre-
liminary agreements as it has been set forth. These statutes may
have no effect on such agreements; or they may invalidate them
to the extent of excluding preliminary offers and contracts from
any consideration by the corporation; or they may expressly im-
pose the obligations of shareholders on preliminary subscribers
who have assented. The provisions of the various statutes have
probably been framed without much thought of these questions,
for there is much diversity among them. But it is none the less
important that they should be effectuated.
The first general act of incorporation in Missouri was enacted
in 1849 64 providing for the organization of corporations for
manufacturing, mining, mechanical or chemical purposes. The
incorporators were required to sign and acknowledge and file in
the office of the circuit clerk and a duplicate with the Secretary
of State, a certificate giving names of directors but not of share-
holders, and the persons who signed and acknowledged such cer-
tificate "and their successors" were made a corporation. None
of the capital stock was required to be paid tip and no definite
63. This is not true of charitable subscriptions in which no con-
tract of shareholding is contemplated, and so in England and New
York such subscriptions are held to be unenforceable gratuitous prom-
ises. In re Hudson (1885) 54 L. J. Ch. 811; Twenty-third St. Baptist
Church v. Cornell (1890) 117 N. Y. 601, 23 N. E. 177.
64. Laws of 1849, p. 18.
3
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amount had to be subscribed. In 1851 65 the act authorizing
the formation of plank road companies required the articles of
association to state the names of "the subscribers" and to be sworn
to by at least two of them, and one thousand dollars of stock had
to be subscribed. The railroad corporation act of 1855 66 incor-
porated the persons who subscribed the articles of association and
"all persons who shall become stockholders" and required a
certain amount of stock to be subscribed, five per cent to be
paid in cash thereon. It also authorized the directors of a rail-
road company to open books of subscription "in case the whole
of the capital stock is not before subscribed". The statute of
1865 67 a§ to telegraph companies required as a condition pre-
cedent that a certain amount of stock should be subscribed and
that all the subscribers thereto should sign articles of association
which should set forth the names of the subscribers, and provided
that such signers together with "the persons who from time to
time shall become stockholders" should be a corporation. The
statute of 1865 68 as to fire and marine insurance companies re-
quired tl e incorporators to sign articles giving the names of the
subscribers and stating that one-half of the capital stock should
have been in good faith subscribed and five thousand dollars
thereof paid up. The statute of 1865 69 as to life, health, stock
and accident insurance companies provides for similar articles
and incorporates the persons who sign them "their associates and
successors". This is the first time that the expression "associates"
appears in the Missouri statutes. The statute of 1865 ro as to sav-
ings banks and fund companies requires the majority of the
shares to be subscribed before business is begun and requires that
the president and secretary shall have filed a certificate in which
the names of the stockholders are given. In 1865 the statute
as to manufacturing and business companies was amended to
require the filing of a certificate in the recorder's office in the
county in which the company was to transact business.7 1  In
65. Laws of 1851, p. 259.
66. Revised Statutes 1855, p. 404.
67. Revised Statutes 1865, p. 348.
68. Revised Statutes 1865, p. 355.
69. Revised Statutes 1865, p. 365.
70. Revised Statutes 1865, p. 365.
71. Revised Statutes 1865, p. 367.
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1868, all of the capital stock of savings banks and fund com-
panies was required to be subscribed at the tine of incorpora-
tion.72 In 1869 the statute as to manufacturing and business com-
panies was amended and the articles were required to be signed
and acknowledged by the incorporators and filed in the office of
the recorder, and it was provided that "all persons so acknowledg-
ing and giving said certificate and their associates and successors"
should be a body corporate. 73
In 1879 the section authorizing directors to open books of
subscription after the organization of the corporation "in case
the whole of the capital stock is not before subscribed" was trans-
ferred from the chapter on railroad corporations to the general
chapter concerning private corporations, so that it thereafter ap-
plies to all corporations. 74 This section had required five per cent
to be paid to the directors at the time of the subscription, and
this requirement was continued until the whole section was re-
pealed in 1909.7
5
In 1879, the statute as to savings bank and fund companies 76
was amended to require the articles to state that all the stock
had been subscribed and one-half paid up, and to give the names
of all shareholders and the number of shares subscribed by each;
such articles to be signed and acknowledged "by the parties
thereto". The privilege of incorporating was given to any five
or more persons associated by such articles and it would seem that
only incorporators were "parties thereto" so as to be required
-to sign. The statute of 1879 as to manufacturing and business
companies77 gave the privilege of incorporating to any three
or more persons who should have associated themseves by
articles which were required to state that all the stock had been
subscribed, one-half paid up, and to give the names of the several
shareholders and the number of shares subscribed by each; such
72. Laws of 1868, p. 30.
73. Laws of 1869, p. 10.
74. Revised Statutes 1879, § 711.
75. Laws of 1909, p. 347. It is difficult to believe that the con-
tinuance of at least that portion of the section which required five per
cent to be paid at the time of subscription was anything more than
an oversight of the revisioners.
76. Revised Statutes 1879, § 902.
77. Revised Statutes 1879, § 926.
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articles to be signed and acknowledged "by the parties thereto"'
and after proper filing the persons so acknowledging and "their
associates and successors" were to be a corporation7 8
The statute of 1885 as to trust companies 79 authorized in-
corporation by three or more persons associated by articles stating
the amount of the stock actually subscribed which had to be at
least one-fourth of the authorized capital stock, and one half
of the subscribed stock was required to be paid up and the names
of the shareholders given; the articles to be signed and acknowl-
edged ."by the parties thereto" and the corporation to be com-
posed of such persons "their associates and successors".
In 1899, a new statute 80 authorized the formation of world's
fair and centennial expositions by any twenty-five or more per-
sons associated by articles which were required to state that one-
half the stock had been subscribed and ten per cent thereof paid
up, and to give the names of the first fifty of the subscribing
shareholders; such articles to be signed and acknowledged by
the parties thereto and the persons so signing and acknowledg-
ing and their successors to be a corporation. It is very plain
that the' statute requires the naming only of the first fifty of the
shareholders; that there may be other shareholders not named;
and that all of the named shareholders need not sign the articles
of agreement as "parties thereto". It is possible that under this
statute incorporators would not be required to be shareholders.
No substantial changes were made in the statutes of incor-
p6ration in 1909, but in 1911 a wholly new statute 81 concerning
the organizing of manufacturing and business companies was
enacted, by which incorporation is permitted to any three or more
persons associated in articles of agreement which state the amount
of the capital stock, that fifty per cent thereof has been sub-
scribed and actually paid up, and which give the names of the,
several shareholders and the number of shares subscribed by
each. The statute also provides for a later sale by the corpora-
78. The new statute of 1879, § 958 et seq. as to mutual saving
fund, loan and building associations has no peculiar interest In this
connection.
79. Laws of 1885, p. 123.
80. Revised Statutes 1899, § 1523.
81. Laws of 1911, p. 148.
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tion of all of its stock "not subscribed and paid for at the time
of its organization". The articles are required to be "signed and
acknowledged and sworn to by all parties thereto, including the
parties selected as directors or managers for the first year".8 2
Since a director must be a stockholder 83 it is impossible to see
any reason for the specific requirement of directors' signing if
they were included in the expression "parties thereto"; which
seems to indicate that the expression "parties thereto" does not
include all persons named as shareholders.
It is clear from the foregoing exposition that these statutes
do not admit of general application. Each case must be decided
with close reference to the actual terms of the statute under
which incorporation is attempted. Where a statute does not
require shareholders to be named it would seem that preliminary
subscribers should not be required to sign articles of association;
where the shareholders are required to be named, it would seem
that all need not be incorporators, tho all named would of course
be legal shareholders from the instant of the corporation's birth.
The "parties" to the articles who are required to sign and acknowl-
edge are the incorporators, not the shareholders,8 4 as is clearly
indicated by the statute-of 1911 which expressly requires directors
to be among such "parties", tho directors are of necessity share-
holders; if all shareholders had to be "parties" to the articles,
this express naming of directors would be superfluous.85 If the
statute does require shareholders to be named and requires all
the stock to be subscribed, it would seem that the omiss'ion of
the name of a preliminary subscriber from the complete list of
82. The acknowledgment since 1911 must be before some Missouri
officer having a seal. This requirement works considerable hardship
on non-residents who are named as original shareholders in the articles
if they must sign and acknowledge as incorporators.
83. Loomis v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1904) 165 Mo. 469, 65 S.
W. 962.
84. In First National Bank v. Rockefeller (1905) 195 Mo. 15, 93
S. W. 761, an attempt was made to hold the incorporators as partners
and it was contended that the incorporation was ineffectual because
some of the persons who signed the articles failed to acknowledge them;
but the court refused to go behind the certificate of the Secretary of
State. Cf. Ryland v. Hollinger (1902) 117 Fed. 216.
85. But the Secretary of State interprets the statute to require that
all named shareholders sign. See his instructions issued in "Form for
Incorporating Manufacturing and Business Companies."
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shareholders would discharge him altogether; but this would not
be true where all the stock is not required to be subscribed.
All of the statutes purport to incorporate the "parties" who
execute the articles.8, Since 1869, the statutes as to manufactur-
ing and business companies have purported to incorporate the
parties, "their associates and successors". The meaning of the
word associates should be determined to some extent at least with
reference to its meaning in the statute of 1865 as to life, health,
stock and accident insurance companies, in which it made its
first appearance in Missouri statutes. That statute required the
incorporators to sign the articles of association stating the names
of all the subscribers to the stock, tho there was no requirement
that any particular amount of stock should be subscribed and it
is fairly clear that all the subscribers were not required to act
as incorporators. The associates at that time must have been
subscribers to the stock who intended to be incorporators but
who failed to act as "parties" to the articles which were filed.
In the statute of 1869 as to manufacturing and business com-
panies, in which the word associates was first used as to such
companies there was no requirement that the subscribers or share-
holders be named in the articles. At that time it must have meant
subscribers who were not active as incorporators. No reason
is perceived for the continued use of the word in the statute
of 1879, in which all the stock was required to be subscribed
and all the shareholders were required to be named, unless all
of the named shareholders were not required to be incorporators;
in which case associates must have been a designation for
named shareholders who were not incorporators. To have pre-
86. Quaere, can one who signs and acknowledges the articles which
name him as one of the shareholders, withdraw before the Secretary of
State has issued the certificate? If corporate existence really does date
from the time of filing a copy of the articles with the Secretary of
State, Revised Statutes 1909, § 2975, it wouild seem that such with-
drawal should be permitted. Cf. Revised Statutes 1909, § 3341. Where
both signing and acknowledging of the articles are required, it would
seem that one who signs but fails to acknowledge should not be bound
as an incorporator. Coppage v. Hutton (1890) 124 Ind. 401, 24 N. E.
112; Greenbrier Industrial Exposition v. Rodes (1893) 37 W. Va. 738,
17 S. E. 305. In Metropolitan Lead & Zinc Mining Co. v. Webster(1906) 193 Mo. 351, 92 S. W. 79, an incorporator, who had been induced
to become such by fraud, was held not liable on his subscription.
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liminary subscribers not named in the articles included among
"associates" under this statute, would be to abrogate the effect
of the provision that all shareholders should be named. Con-
ceivably, preliminary subscribers might become incorporators
by force of the word associates without becoming shareholders,
but such a result would be absurd under the Missouri statutes.
Unless all the named shareholders were not required to be in-
corporators and as such to sign and acknowledge the articles
between 1879 and 1911, it is difficult to find any meaning what-
ever for the word associates during that period. Since 1911,
tho it is unnecessary that all of the stock should be stated to be
subscribed, the names of the "shareholders" must be given in the
articles. This provision will be abrogated if associates is made
to include preliminary subscribers not so named, for by such
inclusion they would become shareholding incorporators imme-
diately upon the birth of the corporation. This, too, without any
reference to the intent of the preliminary subscribers at the time
of their signing. It is submitted that the proper interpretation
of the word associates in the present statute as in the statute of
1879 which prevailed until 1909, will make it refer only to sub-
scribers for stock who are named in the articles but who fail
to execute them. And with the general practise compelled by
the Secretary of State of having all named shareholders to
execute the articles as parties thereto, the word associates becomes
insignificant. But this does not mean that preliminary subscrip-
tions are forbidden by the statute. It means that preliminary
subscribers are not made incorporators by the statute
and their relation to the corporation is therefore to be fixed with-
out reference to the statute.
It is interesting to note that the new statute concerning the
incorporation of building and loan associations enacted in 1915 s
provides for the incorporation of twenty-five or more persons
associated by an agreement in writing, and all who may there-
after become associated with them, which articles are required
to state the names of the incorporators and the number of shares
subscribed and to be signed and acknowledged by any ten of the
parties thereto.
87. Laws of 1915, p. 231.
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V REVIEW OF MISSOURI DECISIONS
The Missouri courts have followed a tortuous course in deal-
ing with preliminary subscription agreements. The first litiga-
tion to reach an appellate court was in Southern Hotel Co. v.
Newman,"s in which the Supreme Court held that it was error
to exclude evidence that the original subscription paper which
had been signed by the defendant had been abandoned and that
the corporation was formed in reliance on a wholly new sub-
scription list. The court said that "corporators would have no
right to set aside or annul subscriptions at their pleasure, with-
out the assent or acquiescence of the subscribers; but why may
not the subscribers, before the rights of third persons have inter-
vened, agree to abandon their subscription, and to regard it as
no longer of any force or effect?" There was no other indica-
tion of the court's view of the nature of the preliminary agree-
ment.
Keane v. Beard 89 and Ghio v. Beard,90 in the St. Louis
Court of Appeals, arose out of a preliminary agreement under
which numerous persons agreed to take stock and to employ
the defendant Beard as an agent of the corporation to be formed.
The subscriptions were paid in advance to Beard in cash and
notes, and he proceeded to purchase the property which the
corporation was to be formed to handle, but the corporation was
never formed. In both cases the plaintiffs recovered from Beard
the amounts advanced, in actions which resembled actions for
money had and received. It was held that other subscribers
were not necessary parties and the court said "that so far as
questions of procedure are concerned, the contract of subscrip-
tion to the capital stock of a corporation has always been re-
garded as a several contract between each subscriber and the
corporation or other contracting party". It is clear that the agree-
ment was not considered the mutual contract of all the sub-
scribers.
88. (1860) 30 Mo. 118. It is not clear in LaGrange & Monticello
Plank Road Co. v. Mayo (1859) 29 Mo. 64, whether the defendant had
signed the articles or a preliminary paper.
89. (1881) 11 Mo. App. 10.
90. (1881) 11 Mo. App. 21.
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New Lindell Hotel Co. v. Smith,9 1 in the St. Louis Court of
Appeals, involved an agreement by numerous persons with a
Mrs. Ames to contribute certain sums of money to a corporation
which she agreed to procure to be organized and to which she
agreed to convey a site in St. Louis to be used for a hotel. It
was in reality a series of bilateral contracts to which the various
subscribers and Mrs. Ames were parties, tho each of the sub-
scribers purported to contract 'With the others and the unborn
corporation. The court held that the subscriptions enured to the
benefit of the corporation so as to be enforceable by it and found
the mutual promises of the several subscribers to be consideration
for each other, wholly neglecting the consideration in Mrs. Ames'
undertaking. The subscription seems to have been regarded as
a subscription to stock, but it was only a donation of a bonus
in which no contract with the corporation was contemplated.
Even if there had been no bilateral contracts with Mrs. Anes,
the subscriptions would have been enforceable after Mrs. Ames
had performed the acts called for from her as the considera-
tion.9 2
In Haskell v. Sells,93 the defendant had signed a preliminary
subscription agreement in which each subscriber "agreed to take
a certain number of shares of stock in the corporation to be
formed and to pay the par value thereof to the corporation".
The corporation was duly organized under the statute of 1870 94
and became insolvent. The defendant knew nothing of what had
happened after his subscription until he was sued by the assignee
to enforce a stockholder's liability. The lower court had held
that the beginning of the contemplated business constituted an
acceptance of the subscription; without any analysis, the St.
Louis Court of Appeals treated the subscription as a contract
enuring to the benefit of the corporation and the plaintiff re-
covered. It was intimated that a different result might have been
reached under a statute requiring the articles to name all share-
91. (1882) 13 Mo. App. 7.
92. Workman v. Campbell (1870) 46 Mo. 309; James v. Clough
(1887) 25 Mo. App. 153.
93. (1883) 14 Mo. App. 91.
94. Wagner's Missouri Statutes 1870, Art. VII.
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holders. In pursuance of an option allowed him by the promoter,
the subscriber in this case had notified the promoter who had
solicited him that he would not take the stock and the promoter
seems to have agreed to release him. This was before the in-
corporation, but the court thought it unavailing, tho little atten-
tion was given to the point.95  If it had been inclined to find
that the subscriber could withdraw, it is submitted that notice
to the leading promoter who had induced the subscription was
a sufficient notice of withdrawal. 96
The leading case in Missouri is Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern
Railway Co. v. Wilkerson,97 in which a railway company sought
to enforce a preliminary agreement to take a certain number of
shares of its stock against the estate of a subscriber who had
died before the incorporation was completed. The statute then
in force purported to incorporate the persons who had subscribed
the articles of association and "all persons who shall become
stockholders" and provided that the directors "may, in case the
whole of the capital stock is not before subscribed, open books
of subscription to fill tip the capital stock of the company";98
and it did not require shareholders to be named in the articles.
The court held that the statute excluded any other method of
becoming a subscriber to the capital stock of a corporation, except
by signing the articles of association or by subscribing the book
opened after the creation of the corporation. This interpretation
was probably due to the influence of two New York cases cited
by the court, Troy & Boston R. R. v. Tibbits 99 and Poughkeepsie
& Salt Point Plank Road Co. v. Griffin, 10O both of which were
decided under the New York statute which in terms provided
that preliminary subscribers should also subscribe the articles of
95. The court cited Hughes v. Antietam (1870) 34 Md. 316, in
which the subscriber signed the certificate of association.
96. Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower (1894) 161 Mass. 10, 36 N.
E. 680; Planters' C. Merchants' Independent Packet Co. v. Webb (Ala.,
1908) 46 So. 977.
97. (1884) 83 Mo. 235.
98. Wagner's Missouri Statutes 1870, p. 299, and Laws of 1877,
p. 371. The sections are the same as Revised Statutes 1879, §§ 711, 764.
99. (1854) 18 Barb. 297.
100. (1861) 24 N. Y. 150, overruling Poughkeepsie & Salt Point
Plank Road Co. v. Griffin (1856) 21 Barb. 454.
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association. 1' 1 The Missouri statute was copied from a later
New York statute 102 which in Buffalo & Jamestown R. R. v.
Gifford,10 3 decided two years before Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern
Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson, was held "not to prescribe a fixed statutory
mode of making a subscription". 10 4 Perhaps owing to its recent-
ness, this later New York decision was overlooked by the Mis-
souri court. A board of directors has power to open books of
subscription independently of statute and the view of the Mis-
souri court that the statute enumerating such a power excludes
common law subscriptions perfected by the corporation's accept-
ance of preliminary offers or by its taking advantage of contracts
made for its benefit, is wholly untenable and unsustained by
authority.
But the judgment that the deceased subscriber's estate in
Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson was not liable
on the subscription may be justified on other grounds. Haskell
v. Sells, which had been decided a year previously, was not cited
by the court and it was authority for holding that the corporation
could recover on the contract made for its benefit before its
organization in spite of the subscriber's death. But the sub-
scription in Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson
was clearly not a mutual contract and Haskell v. Sells might have
been repudiated; unfortunately the court gave no attention to
this phase of the case. The subscription was only an offer to the
corporation which it was impossible for the corporation to accept
after its organization because of the previous death of the of-
101. N. Y. Laws of 1847, c. 210, and N. Y. Laws of 1848, ch. 140
are in this respect identical.
102. N. Y. Laws of 1850, c. 140, art. 4.
103. (1882) 87 N. Y. 294. See also Peninsular Ry. Co. v. Duncan
(1873) 28 Mich. 130.
104. The court said of the New York statute, in all respects iden-
tical with the Missouri statute: "It does not prohibit or forbid any
other mode of subscription and it is not perceived that any public policy
would be subserved by holding that any subscription valid at common
law is invalid by this section of the statute, and we are inclined to the
opinion that it was not intended by this section to prescribe a fixed
statutory mode of making a subscription and that any contract of
subscription good and valid at common law is still valid, notwithstand-
ing this section."
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feror .05 It is for this reason that the right result was reached
in Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson.
Haskell v. Worthington,l°6 in the Supreme Court, involved
the same agreement passed on by the St. Louis Court of Appeals
in Haskell v. Sells. The defendant Worthington was the last
of the subscribers to sign, but he was held not liable on the ground
that all of the capital stock as stated in the recorded certificate
had not been subscribed. 10 7 Haskell v. Sells was not cited and
the court did not address itself to the possibility of recovery
where all the capital stock is subscribed los tho it seems to have
been taken for granted. It was said obiter that the defendant
was not released because the corporation as organized had addi-
tional powers to those contemplated at the time of the defendant's
subscription, such additional powers being incidental to those con-
templated.
In Ollesheimer v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 10 9 the defending
stockholders had signed the articles of association and it was
entirely obiter that the court spoke of the contract of subscription,
which was said to "inure to the benefit of the 'corporation as soon
as it is formed", and to be a polypartite contract between each
subscriber and each of the others "in a sense which creates an
estoppel against the subscriber", which "estoppel enures to the
benefit of subscribers subsequently signing".
Davis v. Johnson 110 shows the possibilities of the prelim-
inary situation in that the various subscribers who proposed to
form a corporation, contracted with the plaintiffs to accept and
pay for a building which the plaintiffs agreed to erect. The
subscribers became liable to the plaintiffs when the latter erected
the building as agreed and turned it over to the corporation,
105. Wallace v. Townsend (1885) 43 Ohio St. 537, 3 N. E. 601.
Cf. Beach v. Methodist Church (1880) 96 Ill. 177.
106. (1887) 94 Mo. 560, 7 S. W. 481.
107. In Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern Ry. Co. v. Abell (1885) 17'
Mo. App. 645, the statute expressly authorized the corporation to begin
business before all of its capital stock had been subscribed, so the
defendant who signed the articles of association was held liable tho
all the stock had not been subscribed.
108. Haskell v. Worthington was approved in a dictum in He-
quembourg v. Edwards (1899) 155 Mo. 514, 521, 56 S. W. 490.
109. (1890) 44 Mo. App. 172.
110. (1892) 49 Mo. App. 240.
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,irrespective of rights which each subscriber might have had
against the corporation. Such a subscription constituted a bilateral
contract with the builders, tho a further contract with the cor-
poration was contemplated. Similarly, subscribers might become
liable to promoters and the case is not unlike New Lindell Hotel
Co. v. Smith.
In Newland Hotel Co. v. Lowe Furniture Co.,1 1 the pre-
liminary subscription was ultra vires to the corporation which
made it and the subscriber was not bound. But the Kansas City
Court of Appeals said that "the subscription if valid of course
enured to the benefit of the plaintiff [the corporation]. 'This
assertion is too well settled to require the citation of the authori-
ties to support it". And the same court said of the same pre-
liminary agreement in Newland Hotel Co. v. Wright,1 12 "the sub-
scription paper became as between the parties thereto a binding
contract, the obligation of each and all being a consideration for
the undertaking of every other subscriber. And said contract,
good between the parties at the time, inured to the benefit
of the corporation when subsequently formed." But the pre-
liminary subscription paper in these cases was of the most in-
formal sort and could not have been more than an offer which
ripened into a contract when accepted by the corporation. In
the latter case, after all the stock had been subscribed the de-
fendant subscriber met with the other subscribers and participated
in the meeting which appointed a committee to formally incor-
porate the company and "to sign as the holders of all the stock".
This was held to estop him to deny his liability. But the stock
was not all subscribed since the subscription of the Lowe Furni-
ture Co. was void because it was ultra vires; this point was not
noticed, but on the authority of Haskell v. Worthington it should
have been held a sufficient defense.113 The incorporation was
tinder the statute as to manufacturing and business companies 114
111. (1897) 73 Mo. App. 135.
112. (1897) 73 Mo. App. 240.
113. Cf. McCoy v. World's Columbian Exposition (1900) 186 Ill.
356, 57 N. E. 1043. But see United States Vinegar Co. v. Foehrenbach
(1895) 148 N. Y. 58, 42 N. E. 403.
114. .Revised Statutes 1889, §§ 2768, 2769, as amended in Laws
of 1891, pp. 77, 79.
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as enacted in 1879, but the court found it unnecessary to interpret
its provisions.
A preliminary subscription was enforced in Louisiana Pur-
chase Exposition Co. v. Kunzell,115 the corporation having been
organized under the world's fair corporation statute of 1899.116
The only contention was that the condition that a certain amount
of stock should be subscribed had not been complied with. The
preliminary subscription constituted an offer to the corporation
which had been accepted subsequently- to its organization and no
question was raised as to the validity of this contract.
Shelby County Railway Co. v. Crow 117 is a companion case
to Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson and was
decided by the St. Louis Court of Appeals under the same statute.
The preliminary subscription was informal, each signer subscrib-
ing the amount set opposite his name as the amount of stock to
be taken in a corporation to be formed. Tho it was bound to
follow the decision of the Supreme Court in Sedalia, Warsaw &
Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson, the St. Louis Court of Appeals
protested very vigorously against that decision, stating its view
to be that a subscription to the stock of a corporation is a "tri-
lateral contract, that is, an undertaking not only between the cor-
poration and the individual stockholder, but it is an undertaking
between the corporation, the individual subscriber and all other
subscribers to the stock as well". One is surprised to read, how-
ever that this "doctrine obtains generally". Indeed, it cannot to
be said to prevail except in Pennsylvania, where recent decisions
have been to this effect."" Tho contracts are now generally classi-
fied as unilateral and bilateral, the term trilateral has rarely been
used. The common law does not seem to admit of the conception
of a trilateral contract. It is possible for A to promise B in
115. (1904) 108 Mo. App. 105, 82 S. W. 1099.
116. Revised Statutes 1899, § 1523 et seq.
117. (1909) 137 Mo. App. 461, 119 S. W. 435.
118. Graff v. Pittsburgh & Steubensville R. R. Co. (1858) 31 Pa.
St. 489; Philadelphia, etc. R. R. Co. v. Conway (1896) 177 Pa. 364;
35 At. 716; Acetylene Light Co. v. Beck (1898) 6 Pa. Super Ct. 584;
Braddock Ry. v. Bily (1899) 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 144; Altoona Milk Co.
v. Armstrong (1909) 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 350; Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn
Mower Co. (1909) 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 78.
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consideration of B's promise to C, B's promise in turn being in
consideration of C's promise to A; or for A to be obligated to
B and C severally, B to A and C severally and C to A and B sev-
erally by one agreement, the obligations being respectively in con-
sideration of each other; but these are nothing more than series of
bilateral contracts. The term trilateral indicates simply a num-
ber of separate obligations as the term tripartite indicates a
number of parties. Contractual obligations at common law must
be the result of either unilateral or bilateral contracts and even a
unilateral contract must be at least bipartite. It would seem to
serve no useful purpose to employ the ambiguous term trilateral
in connection with subscription contracts. But for the decision
in Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern Ry. Co. v. ['ilkerson, the sub-
scriber might have been held in Shelby County Ry. Co. v. Crow
on the ground that the demurrer admitted that after the corpora-
tion was organized it had accepted the offer contained in the
subscription and had tendered a certificate of stock to the sub-
scriber. Such facts would seem to have entitled the corporation
to treat the subscriber as a stockholder.
In Business Men's Association v. Williams,11 9 the defendant
had subscribed an informal agreement to take stock in a corpora-
tion to be organized and after the incorporation had been com-
pleted had actually paid a part of his subscription. The cbr-
poration was organized under the statute concerning nanufac-
turing and business companies 124) so that the St. Louis Court of
Appeals was not bound to follow Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern
Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson as it had been in Shelby County Ry. Co. v.
Crow. The court expressed the view that the preliminary sub-
scription constituted a valid contract between the subscribers for
the benefit of the corporation to be formed, tho it did not clearly
distinguish between such a contract and a mere offer to the
corporation. It seems to have been thought that the mere
organization of the company would in itself constitute an accept-
ance of an offer made to the corporation. The decision was put
on the ground that the defendant was estopped to deny his lia-
119. (1909) 137 Mo. App. 575.
120. Revised Statutes 1899, § 1312.
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bility after having paid a part of his subscription. 121 The di-
rectors had been authorized to proceed with the organization of
the company and to vote the stock of the subscribers as they
might see fit. All of the stock had been issued to the persons
who acted as incorporators and it was therefore impossible for
the corporation to issue to the defendant any stock which had
not previously been issued.
The attempt to form a corporation in Loewenberg v. De-
Voigne 122 was abortive. It had been preceded by an agreement
among various persons that a majority in interest of the sub-
scribers should organize a corporation for certain purposes and
the defendant refused to participate in such organization. The
petition was held bad on demurrer. It is not clear that the
defendant had agreed to join in the incorporation or to take
shares in the corporation when formed, but even if such were
the case the agreement was too indefinite to be enforced. 123
In Palais du Costume Co. v. Beach,12 4 the defendant was
not one of the original subscribers. But the Springfield Court of
Appeals seems to have thought an original subscription might be
withdrawn before acceptance by the corporation.
Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co. v. Schnurmacher, first
decided by the Springfield Court of Appeals 125 and later by the
St. Louis Court of Appeals, 126 arose under the statute as to
world's fair corporations 127 which does not substantially differ
from the railroad corporation statute under which Sedalia, War-
saw & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson was decided, except that
the articles of agreement, tho they must be signed by only twenty-
five incorporators, must state the names of the first fifty sub-
scribing shareholders and the corporation is to be composed of
121. Kirkwood Gymnasium Assn. v. Van Ness (1895) 61 Mo. App.
361, is in accord, but the defendant there was one of the incorporators.
Cf. Nebraska Chicory Co. v. Lednicky (1907) 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W.
245. Quaere, whether the giving of a note for a part of the subscrip-
tion would have the same effect.
122. (1909) 145 Mo. .712.
123. Watson v. Bayliss (Wash., 1913) 128 Pac. 1061.
124. (1910) 144 Mo. App. 456, 129 S. W. 270 (1911) 163 Mo. App.
499, 143 S. W. 852.
125. (1910) 151 Mo. App. 601, 132 S. W. 326.
126. (1911) 160 Mo. App. 611, 140 S. W. 1198.
127. Revised Statutes 1899, § 1523 et seq.
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those who acknowledge the articles of agreement and their suc-
cessors. The preliminary agreement is not set out in terms and
neither court gave attention to the nature of the contract, but
assuming it to exist distinguished the statute so that the sub-
scriber might be held.
The question as to the effect of a preliminary subscription
is squarely presented in the recent case of DeGiverville Land Co.
v. Thompson 128 in the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which arose
under the statute as to manufacturing and business companies
in force until 1911. Numerous persons subscribed for certain
numbers of shares of stock in a corporation to be formed for
the purchase and sale of certain land, and appointed a com-
mittee to effect the purchase and to borrow money and give
a deed of trust for this purpose -if necessary and to cause to
be formed a corporation to which such land should be conveyed.
The committee prepared articles of agreement which named an
attorney, not a member of the committee, as the holder of a large
number of shares which had been subscribed for by numerous
persons of whom the defehdant was one. The committee then
borrowed a sum of money equal to what defendant agreed to
pay for shares and consummated the purchase, taking title in
the name of the corporation. The corporation sued for the
amount of defendant's subscription and -recovered. It was held
that the statute 129 does not require the subscribers to sign the
articles of association, and that they are included in the word
"associates", and on this ground the court distinguished Sedalia,
Warsaw & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson and Shelby County
Ry. Co. v. Crow. It was admitted by the court that the statute
of 1909 requires all named shareholders to sign the articles 130
but stated that there could be incorporators who did not sign; 131
the effect of this would be that there were incorporators who were
not shareholders. Surely this is not a proper interpretation of
128. (1915) 190 Mo. App. 682, 176 S. W. 409.
129. Revised Statutes 1909, § 3339 et seq.
130. This as a result of the requirement that the articles state
"the names and places of residence of the several shareholders" and be
signed "by the parties thereto".
131. This as a result of the incorporation of the persons who ac-
knowledge the articles, and their "associates" and successors.
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the statute. The court said that the preliminary agreement con-
stituted a trilateral contract and spoke of the mutual promises
of other subscribers as consideration for the defendant's promise
which inured to the benefit of the corporation. But on this theory
there was a breach of the contract of the other subscribers for
defendant was not named as a shareholder and another person
was named in his stead. When it came into being the corporation
had all of its capital stock held by the shareholders named in
the articles who were entitled to certificates therefor. The cor-
poration was bound to treat the attorney as the holder of the
number of shares which had been set opposite his name in the
articles, for it was in no way affected by the attorney's obligations
to the defendant.' 32  It could not have treated defendant as a
shareholder without going beyond its authorized capital stock
and such conduct would have been ultra vires. a33 Defendant was
therefore left to his recourse against the committee and it is a
question of interpretation of its authority whether it could have
compelled him to receive from the attorney some of the shares
which he held. The lender of the money may have had an
action against the defendant for money lent if it could be shown
that the defendant authorized money to be borrowed when he was
not entitled to any shares as against the corporation but not other-
wise. If the defendant was included among the "associates" as
an original incorporator, then we should have an anomalous situa-
tion in which both the attorney and the defendant would be
entitled under the statute to the same shares of stock. It is dif-
ficult on any theory to work out liability to the corporation.
The court attempts this by saying that the defendant contracted
with the corporation "for the benefit of all the subscribers on
the theory of a trilateral contract", having previously treated
it as a contract between the subscribers for the benefit of the
corporation. This confusion is due to a failure to keep in mind
the distinction between a contract between various persons for
the benefit of the corporation, in no sense a trilateral but simply
132. Boatmen's Bank v. Gillespie (1908) 209 Mo. 217, 108 S. W.
74, quoting with approval from 1 Morawetz, Corporations (2d ed.)
§ 304.
133. See note 11, infra.
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an ordinary contract for the benefit of a third person, and an offer
to a corporation which ripens into a contract when accepted by the
corporation, which contract is for the benefit of the corporation
alone. If such an offer be found in this case, it could not be ac-
cepted by a corporation whose capital stock was already fully sub-
scribed. The court really disregarded the corporate fiction in this
case to justify a recovery by the corporation. It may well be
doubted whether in making the attorney a shareholder instead of
the defendant, the committee did not violate its instructions so as to
release the defendant altogether.13 4  But if the defendant was
liable at all, it would seem that the suit ought to be in the name
of the attorney or the committee or the lender.
It is also sought to justify the result of the decision in
De Giverville Land Co. v. Thompson by saying that the defend-
ant was estopped to deny his liability for what the committee as
his agents had done. In this respect the case is unlike Newland
Hotel Co. v. Wright where the defendant met with the other sub-
scribers and authorized the committee "to sign as the holders of
all the stock", with the understanding that the stock should
subsequently be issued, really transferred, to the subscribers.
Here the defendant had given the committee no such authority
and the committee organized a corporation which was not in any
way bound to treat the defendant as a stockholder, tho it is pos-
sible that the attorney could have been treated as a constructive
trustee of the stock for the defendant. The committee owed no
contractual duty to the defendant except that which every agent
owes to his principal, and it's members did not purport to con-
tract with the corporation as agents of the defendant, tho they
may have borrowed the money as his agents. It is difficult to see,
therefore, how the unauthorized act of his agents constituted any
representation to the corporation which would estop the defend-
ant.13 5
134. Cf. Birmingham National Bank v. Roden (Ala., 1892) 11 So.
883, where one who was named in the articles as a shareholder recov-
ered from the corporation which issued the shares, to which the plain-
tiff was entitled, to a promoter.
135. Cf. Ottawa Dairy Co. v. Sorley (1904) 34 Canada Sup. Ct.
508. Nor can the decision In De Giverville Land Co. v. Thompson bejustified on the authority of Carmichael's Case (1896) 2 Ch. 643, cited
in note 46, supra.
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VI SUMMARY
These decisions leave preliminary stock subscription agree-
ments in a precarious and unsatisfactory position in Missouri law.
It can be much improved by a careful revision of the statutes
of incorporation so as to make it clear who are incorporators
and who are initial shareholders so constituted by the statute.
Meanwhile there must be some interpretation of past and present
statutes with reference to corporations organized under them.
As to the railroad statute in which no change material in
this respect has been made since it was first enacted in 1855,
it is submitted that the decision in Sedalia, Warsaw & Southern
Ry. Co. v. Wilkerson ought to be overruled. As to railroad
corporations organized since 1909, that decision is not binding
in view of the fact that it rests so largely on an interpretation
of the statute authorizing directors to open books of subscrip-
tion, which section was repealed in 1909.
As to manufacturing and business corporations, it is im-
probable that any cases will arise under the old statutes which
prevailed prior to 1879. Under the statute as it existed from
1879 to 1911, it is difficult to find any room for preliminary sub-
scribers since all the stock had to be subscribed and all the share-
holders had to be named in the articles, tho the statute purports
to incorporate "associates". Newland Hotel Co. v. Wright and
Business Men's Association v. Williams do not determine the
construction to be placed on this statute. for both cases can be
rested on, estoppel. It is submitted that this statute was mis-
applied in De Giverville Land Co. v. Thompson. No case has
arisen under the statute of 1911-it is submitted that since all of
the stock is not required to be subscribed, preliminary subscribers
who do not become incorporators and who 'are not named as
shareholders in the articles, may nevertheless become shareholders
after incorporation. This is clearly permitted by the statute as
to world's fair companies.
The statute as to telegraph and telephone companies has since
it was first enacted in 1865 required all preliminary subscribers
to sign the articles. The new statute of 1915 as to building and
loan associations does not in any way restrict preliminary sub-
scriptions.
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Apart from statute, it is difficult to state the result of the
Missouri decisions as to the legal effect of the preliminary sub-
scriptions. The courts show a disposition to find a mutual con-
tract between the subscribers in every case, but all of the decisions
except Haskell v. Sells can be explained by saying that the sub-
scribers had made an offer which the corporation accepted after
its organization. Haskell v. Sells is authority for the proposi-
tion that the subscription constituted a contract from which the
subscriber cannot withdraw even before the organization is com-
pleted. The opinion is poorly considered and the holding is
opposed to the great weight of authority in other states.
It is suggested that preliminary subscribers should always
be made to sign the articles of association, and that to avoid the
consequences of their refusal do so, the preliminary subscription
should always be made to take the form of an agreement between
the promoter and each subscriber, by which both will become
obligated from the moment of the latter's signing.
MANLEY 0. HUDSON.13 6
136. The writer has been ably assisted in the preparation of this
article by S. P. Wilkes, Esq., of the class of 1916.
